

ISSUE

REPORT Nº 30 – July 2016

Strategic communications East and South

WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM

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Reports

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Print ISBN 978-92-9198-497-8 ISSN 1830-9747 doi: 10.2815/12611 QN-AF-16-006-EN-C

PDF 978-92-9198-498-5 ISSN 2363-264X doi: 10.2815/006911 QN-AF-16-006-EN-N

Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in France by Jouve.

Graphic design by Metropolis, Lisbon.

Cover photograph credit: DAMIAN DOVARGANES/AP/SIPA

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FOREWORD

There is no need to explain why the issues and activities analysed in this Report have become crucially important for the EU and its overall security. The way in which Russia and the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Daesh, have supported hostile actions on the ground with disinformation and propaganda on air and online has tangibly contributed to the destabilisation of the Union's neighbouring regions and, to a lesser extent, also of Europe itself. Their actions have often been investigated and dissected separately, as they are undeniably distinct and each is peculiar in its own right. Yet it is equally undeniable that their combined impact has underscored the need for the EU to respond in a consistent manner, in line with its common values and interests and through a more coordinated set of activities and messages. There is thus merit in attempting a comparison between the two cases – however different they may be in terms of their sources, ends and means – in order to highlight where our own vulnerabilities lie, and how to address them. It could also be useful to bring together different types of expertise and to draw lessons from the experiences made so far.

The EUISS is extremely grateful to the European Parliament's Directorate-General for External Policies (DG EXPO) for offering the opportunity to delve into these issues in a more systematic manner and to mobilise the necessary know-how to produce what was initially a major study produced by the Institute in early May. This Report represents a slightly updated and revised version of that study, which was produced in the context of the framework service contract signed by the two parties in late 2015. Our gratitude is therefore twofold, as the Parliament also kindly allowed us to print this version and make it available to our traditional audiences.

This Report is the result of a truly collective effort, which made it possible to cover so much ground in such a short time. EUISS Director Antonio Missiroli and Public Information Officer John-Joseph Wilkins coordinated the project and oversaw its overall structure and scope, including the introduction and the final chapter. Nicu Popescu coordinated the drafting of chapter I, supported by Martin Breitmaier and Ido Bar, as well as Dimitar Bechev, Cameron Johnston and Stanislav Secrieru from outside the Institute. Jan Joel Andersson coordinated the drafting of chapter II, assisted by Zoe Stanley-Lockman. Florence Gaub coordinated the drafting of chapter III, with external contributions from Samar Batrawi and Predrag Petrovic. Our hope is that the result may help increase awareness in and around the EU of the importance of strategic communications as well as focus and tailor effective common responses.

Antonio Missiroli

Paris, July 2016

INTRODUCTION

Just like the term ‘hybrid’ (often associated with warfare, tactics or threats), ‘strategic communication(s)’ – which this Report will use in the plural form – has recently become rather fashionable. Moreover, not unlike ‘hybrid’, it often lacks a clear definition. This has advantages, of course, as the term can be used to cover a wide range of disparate issues and activities. Still, a better understanding of its possible scope can be of help in assessing the extent to which it is applicable to the actions and actors analysed in this publication.

What’s in a name?

Broadly speaking, strategic communications infuses ‘communications’ activities with an agenda or a plan. The field of ‘communications’ is broad, encompassing individuals and organisations who create news or push information (public relations firms, broadcasters), who deliver news and media (journalists), and who study the interplay between media and society (researchers). As an umbrella term, ‘strategic communications’ combines them all – especially the pushing and the delivering – thanks also to new forms of engagement, the proliferation of different types of media, and low entry barriers.

Depending on the nature of an organisation, ‘strategic communications’ can range from marketing to policy. It can also refer to a process as well as a profession – let alone an academic discipline in its own right. Most importantly, it implies and requires tight coordination and consistency across the board in order to purposefully implement a large set of different, targeted and tailored actions. A useful definition, especially for the scope of this publication, is offered in a 2011 Chatham House report, in which strategic communications is described as ‘a systematic series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted across strategic, operational and tactical levels, that enables understanding of target audiences and identifies effective conduits to promote and sustain particular types of behaviour’.¹

In practice, for policy-related organisations, it includes elements of public diplomacy and ‘spin’, media relations, advertising, recruitment and training and, most notably, high levels of situational awareness (‘detect and deter’). In operational terms, it entails both a defensive (‘react and respond’) and an offensive (‘probe and push’) dimension.

1. Paul Cornish, Julian Lindley-French and Claire Yorke, ‘Strategic Communications and National Strategy’, Chatham House Report, September 2011, p. 4.

What is it about?

This Report, originally prepared in late April for the European Parliament's Directorate-General for External Policies, intends to explore whether – and equally how – this notion is applicable to Russia and the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), i.e. the two external players which have contributed the most to destabilising the EU's neighbours in recent years. Given that both have engaged in aggressive messaging and deceptive media campaigns, a qualified use of the term 'strategic communications' for both certainly seems in order. That said, a considerable degree of differentiation may be necessary, namely between a large state with powerful resources, extensive outreach (including to fellow 'nationals' in third countries) and active cooperation with the EU and its member states on a number of issues, and a dispersed organisation combining 'proto-state' or state-like behaviour where it is in control of territory with a sect-like *modus operandi*, acting across borders, operating outside the law and killing EU citizens.

Accordingly, this Report will analyse the 'what' and the 'how': the respective narratives of each actor, their specificities, their few similarities and their numerous differences.

This publication will also highlight what has been and is being undertaken to respond to these strategic communications campaigns – notably, but not exclusively, by the EU (and in this respect, under what constraints and within what limits). Finally, it will explore what more could be done, what could be done better, as well as how and by whom, in the current context. Particular attention will be devoted to the sources, the vectors, the conduits, the targets – including unconventional ones – and of course the responses. Dedicated boxes will be used to highlight specific aspects of the problem and complement the core analysis.

For the EUISS, as an autonomous EU agency funded by the member states, the main focus will be on the role that EU institutions, bodies and agencies in particular have played and can play in this domain. This is why the Report does not include detailed or systematic reference to initiatives at the national level, which would also require much more time and resources and have to delve into the sensitive domain of intelligence and counter-intelligence activities.

I. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE EAST

Russia's strategic communications are complex, both with regard to ideas and institutions. Carried out both directly and through proxies, they shape people's perceptions of the EU – be it inside Russia, in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) states or in the EU itself, as well as its candidate countries. In light of the goals it intends to achieve, Russia's messaging has proved quite effective, if not necessarily consistent: while often crude and deceitful in terms of content, its delivery is sophisticated, targeted and tailored to different audiences, and capable of exploiting the EU's weaknesses.

Russia's grand narrative(s)...

The so-called 'Colour Revolutions' in Georgia and Ukraine (2003-2004) were a wake-up call for Russia. The resulting internal debate on what went wrong led Moscow to conclude that it needed to build up its own 'soft power', partly by making more attractive offers, but partly also by developing the machinery to promote itself through media, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and other key players – from business lobbies to political parties. Most importantly, this was accompanied by the realisation that 'selling' Russia was not enough. The 'attractiveness gap' between Russia and the EU had to be bridged by improving Russia's standing – mainly through the promotion of the 'Russian World' (*Russkiy Mir*) – but also by discrediting that of the EU. The launch of Russia Today (RT), a dedicated TV channel, just one year after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, was the first tangible outcome of Russia's lessons learned.²

While the economic crisis that has dominated much of the last decade did not give much for Russia to boast about, it did generate a stream of negative news about the outside world, especially the EU. The focus on attacking others, rather than advertising itself, also granted Russia the possibility of reaching out to social groups that were disappointed with the political and economic situation in Europe.

Russia's strategic communications do contain a 'meta' or grand narrative of sorts, i.e. a series of core themes that consistently appear in most communications efforts. However, these themes vary (according to Russian opportunism) and often contradict one another. Nevertheless, there are a number of recurrent storylines that the Kremlin-inspired media systematically promote.

2. Orysia Lutsevych, 'Agents of the Russian World: Proxy Groups in the Contested Neighbourhood', Chatham House Research Paper, April 2016.

Box 1: Russia's media outlets

Russia Today (RT)

RT consists of seven branches: three 24-hour news channels broadcasting from Moscow in English, Arabic and Spanish, RT USA and RT UK broadcasting from their own offices in Washington and London, RT documentaries (RTD), and RUPTLY, which sells video content to channels around the world and is based in Berlin.

RT was set up in 2005 under the name 'Russia Today' as an exercise in soft power. Its aim was to burnish Russia's image abroad by bringing Russian news to a foreign audience in their own language. Yet, it did not take long to realise there was not much appetite for news praising Russia in the West. There were, however, plenty of potential viewers who were willing to consume negative news about the state of the West. Immediately after the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, therefore, the TV channel opted to 'de-Russify' its brand. It renamed itself 'RT' and refocused its efforts on telling the stories supposedly neglected by the 'Anglo-Saxon' media establishment. Rejecting the journalistic ethics of the BBC and CNN and consciously following in the footsteps of Fox News and MSNBC ('there is no objectivity'), RT gave airtime to well-known but controversial figures such as Julian Assange, editor-in-chief of the WikiLeaks platform. It also turned its attention to YouTube: as a state-backed entity that was not dependent on advertising revenue for its survival, it could afford to make its products freely available on the internet. RT had always dabbled with conspiracy theories but once war broke out in eastern Ukraine, it began to actively promote them. For example, it offered a platform to an 'academic' who accused Ukraine of committing genocide and speculated over whether or not the US had engineered the Ebola epidemic.

Federal funding (in roubles) for RT increased significantly over the last four years but fell slightly in 2016. In dollar terms, however, federal funding for RT is over 25% lower now than it was in 2013. This matters because over 80% of RT's expenses are reportedly paid in foreign currency. This real-term cut in funding perhaps explains the decision to postpone the launch of RT's French and German language channels indefinitely.

Sputnik & co

Besides RT, Russia supports a plethora of websites, media partnerships, and news agencies throughout the world. Among them is Sputnik news, a network of sites launched in November 2014 with the ambition of producing content from 130 cities in 34 countries around the world. It aims to broadcast in 30 languages, including nearly all the languages of the former Soviet Union. The government funds Sputnik through the RT News Agency, the successor to *RIA Novosti*.

Russian state-backed media have also entered into partnerships with Western media outlets. For example, an 8-page supplement dedicated to Russia – *Russia Beyond the Headlines* – appears in 22 countries and 16 languages. Reaching some 32 million readers, it regularly appears in publications such as *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Washington Post*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *Le Figaro*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *El País* and *Le Soir*.

TABLE 1: SPUTNIK ON TWITTER AND FACEBOOK

| Branch | | Twitter | Facebook |
|--------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
| 1 | Sputnik Arabic | 107,000 tweets; 77,700 followers | 1,443,275 likes |
| 2 | Sputnik International (English) | 128,000 tweets; 123,000 followers | 800,462 likes |
| 3 | Sputnik France | 50,100 tweets; 26,700 followers | 203,858 likes |
| 4 | Sputnik Deutschland (German) | 33,900 tweets; 8,502 followers | 137,355 likes |
| 5 | Sputnik Mundo (Spanish) | 42,000 tweets; 17,500 followers | 135,279 likes |
| 6 | Sputnik Turkish | 59,000 tweets; 76,000 followers | 102,109 likes |
| 7 | Sputnik Urdu | 5,999 tweets; 3,236 followers | 42,523 likes |
| 8 | Sputnik Japanese | N/A | 35,649 likes |
| 9 | Sputnik Dari | 13,300 tweets; 825 followers | 31,818 likes |
| 10 | Sputnik Serbian | 46,300 tweets; 5,386 followers | 25,853 likes |
| 11 | Sputnik Vietnamese | 13,400 tweets; 490 followers | 24,607 likes |
| 12 | Sputnik Italia (Italian) | 10,100 tweets; 2,611 followers | 21,369 likes |
| 13 | Sputnik Pashto | 9,950 tweets; 933 followers | 21,085 likes |
| 14 | Sputnik Azerbaijani | N/A | 20,841 likes |
| 15 | Sputnik Persian | 49,700 tweets; 5,696 followers | 18,947 likes |
| 16 | Sputnik Ceska Republika (Czech) | 18,300 tweets; 682 followers | 15,572 likes |
| 17 | Sputnik Polska (Polish) | 17,900 tweets; 2,179 followers | 9,196 likes |
| 18 | Sputnik UK | 19,800 tweets; 5,348 followers | 7,759 likes |
| 19 | Sputnik Abkhaz | N/A | 7,413 likes |
| 20 | Sputnik Georgia | 2,978 tweets; 471 followers | 4,098 likes |
| 21 | Sputnik Kyrgyz | 9,781 tweets; 1 815 followers | 3,107 likes |
| 22 | Sputnik Ossetian | N/A | 2 391 likes |
| 23 | Sputnik Kurdish | 9,477 tweets; 5 526 followers | 1,771 likes |
| 24 | Sputnik Moldova (Romanian) | 3,504 tweets; 200 followers | 1,640 likes |
| 25 | Sputnik Armenian | 2,178 tweets; 678 followers | 1,422 likes |
| 26 | Sputnik Latvija (Latvian) | N/A | 1,348 likes |
| 27 | Sputnik Eesti (Estonian) | 278 tweets; 56 followers | 330 likes |
| 28 | Sputnik Hindi | 19,000 tweets; 1 389 followers | 134 followers |
| 29 | Sputnik USA | 95,100 tweets; 26,600 followers | N/A |
| 30 | Sputnik Chinese | 39,200 tweets; 3,052 followers | N/A |
| 31 | Sputnik Korean | 5,371 tweets; 401 followers | N/A |
| 32 | Sputnik Tajik | N/A | N/A |
| 33 | Sputnik Uzbek | N/A | N/A |
| | | Total followers | Total likes |
| | | 393,665 | 3,121,077 |

Month reviewed: 15 March to 15 April 2016

TABLE 2: RUSSIA TODAY ON TWITTER AND FACEBOOK

| Branch | | Twitter | Facebook |
|--------|---------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
| 1 | RT in Arabic | 294,000 tweets; 2.05m followers | 8,136,211 likes |
| 2 | RT in English | 164,000 tweets; 2.04m followers | 3,432,095 likes |
| 3 | RT in Spanish | 311,000 tweets; 1.08m followers | 1,852,744 likes |
| 4 | RT US | 71,700 tweets; 325,000 followers | 653,702 likes |
| 5 | RT in Russian | 154,000 tweets; 638 000 followers | 373,299 likes |
| 6 | RT in German | 8,719 tweets; 13,200 followers | 192,320 likes |
| 7 | RT UK | 15,500 tweets; 39,700 followers | 69,462 likes |
| 8 | RT France | 31,400 tweets; 45 000 followers | 63,379 likes |
| 9 | RT Serbia | 55 tweets; 83 followers | 1,937 likes |
| 10 | RT in Kurdish | 3 tweets; 2 followers | 24 likes |
| | | Total followers | Total likes |
| | | 6,230,985 | 14,775,173 |

Month reviewed: 18 March to 18 April 2016

One key message depicts the West as an aggressive and expansionist entity on the one hand, and as weak and verging on collapse on the other. The EU is portrayed as close to crumbling under the combined pressure of the fiscal and migration crises. The Union is also depicted as an unwieldy behemoth which is incapable of making decisions due to waves of hasty enlargements to the east. These two representations, in turn, feed into forecasts about the imminent demise of the EU, just as the Soviet Union collapsed 25 years ago.

... and target audiences

This messaging also tries to cater to specific audiences in the EU. Supporters of far-right political groups readily consume news claiming that the EU is actively promoting moral decadence by supporting LGBT rights and neglecting Europe's Christian roots, or that the 'Islamisation of Europe' is currently underway. On the far-left, Russia's messaging feeds anti-US sentiments and portrays the EU as a submissive partner or puppet of Washington.

On both the right and left, Russia also relies on and fosters an anti-interventionist narrative, whereby Western military operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya – as well as the conflict in Ukraine – are all depicted as a string of illegitimate, aggressive Western actions. The debacle in Iraq is the principal example used to reframe the debate about other crises, such as Kosovo or Ukraine.

Box 2: Conspiracy theories

Several Kremlin-financed media outlets are covertly spreading anti-Western conspiracy theories. Among them are the following:

- The disappeared Malaysia Airlines MH370 airplane might have been shot down by the US;
- The Malaysia Airlines MH17 airplane could have been shot down by an Israeli missile or a Ukrainian fighter jet;
- The German authorities tried to cover up the alleged rape of a Russian girl, 'Liza', by migrants in Berlin;
- The West is killing defence witnesses of Serbian war criminals in The Hague;
- The 9/11 attacks may have been planned by the US government;
- Western politicians such as Madeleine Albright have a 'pathological hatred of Slavs' and 'the war in Kosovo was considered only a first step to establish control over Russia' – claims that were allegedly formulated by a former KGB officer with the supposed ability to read minds.

Box 3: Euronews

The multi-language broadcaster Euronews was launched on 1 January 1993 to promote European unity by presenting information from a distinctly European perspective. It airs in 13 languages (including Russian) and reaches a daily audience of 4.4 million. Its *modus operandi* is based on the compulsory use of news features produced by national public TV channels, with very limited scope for its own reporting. Since its launch, Euronews has received €240 million in funding from the European Commission, €25.5 million of which in 2014. In 2001, the Russian state-owned media holding VGTRK bought 1.8% of its shares, and increased its stake to 16.94% the following year. In 2015, Egyptian businessman Nagib Saviris' Media Globe Networks bought 53% of the channel and increased its capital by €35 million, thus lowering VGTRK's relative share to 7.17%.

On several occasions, Euronews has been accused of biased reporting, particularly in its Russian language service. Coverage of the 2008 war in Georgia, the 20th anniversary of Ukrainian independence in 2011, the 2014 referendum in the Donbass and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, as well as the reporting of events in Transnistria, have been criticised as unbalanced and pro-Russian. In August 2014, Ukraine's National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting (*Derzhkomtelevizoradio*) revoked the broadcasting licence of the channel's Russian language service. In March 2015, *Derzhkomtelevizoradio* also revoked the licence of Euronews Ukrainian. The decision came shortly after Ukrainian pro-Kremlin oligarch Dmytro Firtash's Inter Media Group took over the broadcasting rights for Ukrainian language programmes from the NTU channel.

In April 2015, the European Commission held talks with the company to address its future funding strategy, among other issues.

Russian strategic communications efforts also target (and try to influence) specific Western policies, particularly towards Russia. This is most visible on the issue of sanctions. In general, and unsurprisingly, Russia aggressively promotes the idea that sanctions do not work and should not be extended. Tailoring this theme to the business community, Moscow tries to create the impression that sanctions hurt the EU more than they do Russia. In addition to lost revenue, Moscow hints at the possibility of its market being permanently lost to competitors, with China often quoted as the replacement. It also tailors this message to national governments, stressing how many jobs they have lost due to the imposition of sanctions.

Moscow's ultimate goal is to convince European audiences that the EU is focused on imagined threats from Russia and neglecting the real ones from the south. Russia also regularly gets itself involved in other controversial issues inside Europe, be it the Scottish referendum, the Brexit campaign, or the Assange affair. Any potential cleavage or actual divide within the EU is picked up and amplified. The refugee crisis is a case in point: Russia sought to inflame the issue, supporting an anti-refugee stance verging on outright racism, while suppressing any information inside Russia that could damage relations with its own Muslim communities. So while Russian headlines blamed Europe's excessive tolerance for the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, the news of a jihadist Uzbek migrant who killed a child in Moscow was not even reported on Russian state TV.

These same strands of Russian narratives are used in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) states, albeit with local variations. Attacking EU policies is a guiding theme, with the European Union often being equated to the Soviet Union and described as a hostile geopolitical project. The underlying message is that EaP states escaped the Soviet Union only to lose their freedom again to a similar entity, now equally on the verge of economic collapse. In cultural terms, Europe is presented as a morally decadent civilisation turning its back on Christian traditions. Pro-Kremlin media also warn of an imminent relocation of refugees from the EU to EaP states, or that Association Agreements will force the signatories to accept gay marriage.

A second line of attack targets the leaders of EU member states and institutions. The logic behind this is that the worse European leaders look, the weaker the EU as a whole will appear and consequently, the more impressive Russian leadership will seem in comparison. Accordingly, messages often convey a distorted interpretation of declarations to portray the EU as disrespectful, self-serving and largely uninterested in EaP states. EU membership is deemed unattainable while the EU leadership is depicted as being controlled by the US. The EU is also often accused of covering up for corrupt governments or openly interfering in domestic affairs.

Russian campaigns also try to drive a wedge between EaP states and their immediate EU neighbours. Moscow often plants stories in local media about territorial claims (by Romania or Hungary against Ukraine, for example) or other emerging 'security threats' (e.g. 'Roma gangs' from Romania). Russia also presents the Baltics, Roma-

nia and Bulgaria as failing states that are economically depressed and depopulated second-rate EU members, and prophesises the same fate for EaP countries should they join the EU.

In Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, Russia nurtures local elites' chronic fear of externally orchestrated regime change. Narratives portray the EU as seeking to weaken governments to gain access to natural resources or industrial assets on privileged terms. Its financial aid and conditionality, in this context, are described as deliberate efforts to increase indebtedness and thus dependency.

In Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, by contrast, Russia uses uniform messaging on the destructive consequences of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) and visa-free regimes. While the former allegedly lead to deindustrialisation, unemployment, and the loss of access to the Russian market, the latter is said to lead to the risk of refugee reallocation, terror attacks, imposed legislation on LGBT rights, and restrictions on eastward mobility.

Russia also has a rather complex communications strategy – and significant infrastructure – in large parts of the Western Balkans. For example, it sponsors Serbian-language media, both online and in print, that reach out to audiences across the former Yugoslavia. And in 2014, Sputnik launched a service in Serbian, including a digital radio station. There have also been reports of RT launching a Serbian-language service – with prominent film director Emir Kusturica being touted as its prospective director – but this has yet to materialise.

There are also a number of media groups financed by and from Moscow (although not openly) which promote the Kremlin's worldview, often in combination with conspiracy theories and Serbian ultra-nationalism. These include periodicals and online portals such as *Geopolitika*, *Vostok*, *News Front*, *Ruski ekspres*, and *Gazeta*. Last but not least, there are local outlets that explicitly back the Kremlin (*Pravda*, *Pečat*, *Oslobodjenje*, *Srbin.INFO*, *SnagaNaroda* radio, and the Macedonian portal *Infomax*). Openly pro-Kremlin views also feature in parts of the established print and electronic media. For instance, a recent column for *Politika*, Serbia's oldest daily, by analyst Miroslav Lazanski denounced the Panama Papers revelations as a US-sponsored attack against Putin.

Box 4: Gazprom and sports

The Russian energy giant Gazprom has been an important trump card in Moscow's soft power toolbox. While the darker side of its influence can be seen in pressuring neighbours according to their energy dependency, it also improves Russia's international standing by sponsoring international sports. Gazprom's foreign investment in this sphere runs along two lines: the financial support of high-profile sports clubs and the funding of major international events and tournaments.

Since 2007, Gazprom has been the shirt sponsor of the German football club Schalke 04, with the latest contract from 2012-2017 amounting to some €20 million per season. The deal, which was allegedly brokered by former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, saved the club from bankruptcy and was especially lucrative for its chairman Clemens Toennies, whose company opened pig farming facilities in Russia in 2007.

Moreover, Gazprom has been the key sponsor of the popular Serbian team 'Red Star Belgrade' ever since the club experienced serious financial problems in 2010. Since 2012, the company has been Chelsea's energy partner, providing gas and electricity for its training facilities. The London club's owner, Roman Abramovich, is a former key stakeholder of Sibneft (now named Gazprom Neft), and, in 2005, sold his shares in the company to Gazprom for an estimated €10.4 billion.

Since the 2012/2013 season, Gazprom has been a sponsor of the UEFA Champions League. It will also be one of the top sponsors of the International Federation of Football Associations (FIFA) over the next two years and will co-sponsor the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia.

In 2007, the company launched 'Football for Friendship', an international initiative that brings together children from Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia and the UK. Since its launch, Gazprom has invested €22 million in the project.

Finally, looking beyond football, Gazprom has been a key sponsor of the 'Kontinental Hockey League' (KHL) since 2008. The KHL was set up as a rival to the prestigious North American National Hockey League (NHL) and has shown promising results: a number of teams from Belarus, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, Kazakhstan, Latvia and Slovakia have recently joined. Moreover, the KHL has succeeded in recruiting top-level international players and coaches.

Box 5: Russian strategic communications and the Eurovision Song Contest

In recent years, Russia has opportunistically used both success and failure in the Eurovision Song Contests to underpin its public image *vis-à-vis* the West. Its 2008 victory, which President Putin called ‘not only a personal success for Dima Bilan, but one more triumph for all of Russia’, took place in the context of increasing Western criticism of Russia. Among the bones of contention were the 2006 Politkovskaya and Litvinenko murders, the 2007 cyber-attacks on Estonia, as well as deteriorating diplomatic relations with Georgia that culminated in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. The 2009 hosting of the Eurovision show in Moscow, which was enormous in scale and budget (€30 million), thus presented an excellent opportunity for Russia to bolster its flagging international reputation.

Eurovision 2014 was won by Austrian transgender artist Conchita Wurst. The victory took place against the backdrop of the Kremlin’s controversial 2013 law against ‘homosexual propaganda’ and the 2014 deterioration of EU-Russia relations over Ukraine. While many in Europe lauded the victory as showcasing improving integration of sexual minorities and tolerance, Moscow, supported by state media outlets such as Ria Novosti and RT, used the triumph of the transgender candidate as an opportunity to emphasise Russia’s moral superiority over the West. Several Russian officials such as Olga Batalina, the deputy head of the Duma Committee on Family, Women and Children Affairs, and the then-chairperson of the Russian Union of Railways, Vladimir Yakunin, publicly condemned the outcome as a decadent violation of traditional family values.

In May 2016, Ukrainian singer Jamala, who belongs to the Crimean Tatar minority, triumphed at the competition. The lyrics of her song dramatised the deportation of the Crimean Tatars under Stalin and were highly political, not least in the context of Russia’s current crackdown on this particular ethnic minority in the annexed Crimean Peninsula. Popular voting patterns seemed to steer surprisingly clear of geopolitics, with the Ukrainian audience awarding 12 out of 12 points to the Russian candidate and the Ukrainian candidate receiving 10 points from the Russian audience. However, a major controversy sprung from the final results. While the audiences awarded the most points (361) to the Russian entry and only 323 to Ukraine, the final outcome resulted from the jury’s votes, which gave relatively few points to Russia. In the aftermath of the finals, Russian state media exploited the event by alleging that the jury was swayed by a geopolitical bias, and claimed that the results were proof of a ‘new Cold War’ – once again reinforcing the narrative of Russia’s victimisation at the hands of the West.

Russia's strategic communications are further sustained by a growing network of organisations ranging from governmental agencies to government-sponsored NGOs, civic associations, student groups and political movements or parties. A recent report by the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies, a Belgrade-based think tank, counts 80 such entities. The list features *Ruski dom* (Russian House), an institution that traces its roots back to White Russian *émigrés* who left Russia in the interwar period and which now hosts the local branch of the *Rossiiskii institut strategicheskikh issledovanii* (Russian Institute for Strategic Studies) – an organisation attached to the presidency of the Russian Federation. It also hosts the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund, whose board includes Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. There are also other Russian think tanks active in Serbia – such as the Strategic Culture Foundation, which runs a portal in Serbian – as well as a host of local associations cooperating with them (e.g. the New Serbian Political Thought Foundation).

Many political parties have ties to Russia, be it the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) led by Vojislav Šešelj, who was recently acquitted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, or the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). The same applies to the Dveri political movement, as well as minor players such as the Third Serbia Party. Moreover, Putin's United Russia party maintains links with a number of political groups in the region, such as the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, which governs the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina and was expelled from the Socialist International association in 2011 because of its nationalist policies.

The Serbian Orthodox Church also advocates closer ties with Russia, and it is probably no coincidence that Gazprom recently promised to fund the restoration of the St. Sava Cathedral in Belgrade. Patriarch Irinej has argued that the Serbian government should thank Moscow for preventing Kosovo's admittance to UNESCO in November 2015 and advanced the view that Serbia and Russia are united in the standoff with Europe and the US. In addition, Metropolitan Amfilohije, the church's head in Montenegro (which faces competition from the autonomous Montenegrin Orthodox Church), has lobbied for a referendum on NATO accession.

Russia's impact

There is little comparable or systematic polling data across the EU on issues that concern Russia directly or indirectly. Yet the claims of a highly successful Russian 'soft power' offensive across the EU are probably exaggerated (the picture in the EaP countries and the Western Balkans is more mixed though). The few opinion polls available show a clear deterioration of Russia's image throughout the EU over the last few years, especially after the crisis in Ukraine began.

Box 6: Russia in Israel

Russian efforts to influence public opinion and decision-making in its neighbouring countries have been continuous, and well documented, since the 1930s. But its presence in other countries often goes untold. When Israel gained independence, the socialist labour party leading the government was ideologically sympathetic towards the Soviet Union (which was the first country to recognise Israel *de jure* in 1948). Over the course of the Cold War, that sympathy was significantly eroded by Israel's ties to the West. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, over one million Russian Jews immigrated to Israel. These newcomers soon made up 20% of the Israeli population and formed their own political parties, media outlets and economic networks.

Yisrael Beiteinu ('Israel our home'), the political party perceived to represent the Russian electorate in Israel and which is led by Avigdor Lieberman, who served as Israeli foreign minister between 2009-2015 and was recently appointed defence minister, allegedly has strong ties to the Putin administration. Lieberman and his party members have been vocal supporters of Russia and its foreign and counter-terrorism policies. A former close aide within the party also volunteered to serve as an international observer in the Russian elections, which he subsequently lauded as being free and fair.

The biggest Russian-speaking TV channel in Israel is the only national TV station that broadcasts news without being monitored by the Israel Broadcasting Authority. The channel's owner, a mysterious Russian millionaire who is allegedly closely linked to Lieberman, replaced the previous news editor shortly after completing the purchase with a media expert who had previously served as spokesperson for Ramzan Kadyrov, head of the Chechen Republic. The channel generally promotes right-wing nationalist views while Russia's pro-Palestinian actions receive little to no coverage. Furthermore, Russia's actions in the region – including its recent involvement in the Syrian conflict – are often portrayed as coinciding with Israeli interests.

Russia has not been particularly successful in selling its narrative on Ukraine to the European public. Clear majorities in key EU member states blamed the outbreak of war in Ukraine on either Russia or pro-Russian separatists, whereas Russia's official line was that the conflict was caused by Ukraine and the West. That said, the same polls suggested that 15-20% of people believed Moscow's argument, thus indicating the appeal that Russian messaging has in some segments of the EU public. Russia is certainly not winning the war for hearts and minds on the European front, nor is it dominating the European public debate on certain issues (there is no evidence whatsoever, for instance, that it managed to influence the recent Dutch referendum campaign about an EU free trade agreement with Ukraine) – but it is not losing, either. Russian narratives have 'trickled up' to significant parts of the European elite and have influenced the EU's approaches to Russia and Ukraine, while playing on growing internal dissatisfaction within the Union.

Figure 1: In NATO countries, Russia bears largest share of blame for violence in Ukraine


Who is most to blame for the violence in eastern Ukraine?

| | Pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine | Ukrainian government | Russia | Western countries | Don't know |
|---------|------------------------------------|----------------------|--------|-------------------|------------|
| | % | % | % | % | % |
| US | 15 | 13 | 42 | 5 | 22 |
| Canada | 18 | 5 | 37 | 7 | 29 |
| France | 30 | 14 | 44 | 9 | 2 |
| Germany | 25 | 9 | 29 | 12 | 17 |
| Italy | 22 | 7 | 29 | 6 | 23 |
| UK | 17 | 7 | 40 | 7 | 24 |
| Spain | 15 | 9 | 37 | 8 | 21 |
| Poland | 15 | | 37 | 3 | 8 |

Note: Data for volunteer categories 'more than one named', 'all of the above' and 'none of the above' not shown. In all categories, volunteer countries represent less than 15%.

Source: Pew Research Center, Spring 2015 Global Attitudes Survey, Q47.

Figure 2: Countries with the strongest growth in negative perceptions of Russia in 2014 (% of the population)



Source: *Tsentr Nautshmoi polititsheskoi mysli i ideologii*

Figure 3: Europeans. Americans more negative toward Russia


Do you have a favourable or unfavourable view of Russia?

| | 2013 | | 2014 | | <i>13-14 Change Unfavourable</i> |
|---------|----------|------------|----------|------------|--------------------------------------|
| | Fav % | Unfav % | Fav % | Unfav % | |
| US | 37 | 43 | 19 | 72 | +29 |
| Poland | 36 | 54 | 12 | 81 | +27 |
| UK | 38 | 39 | 25 | 63 | +24 |
| Spain | 38 | 51 | 18 | 74 | +23 |
| Germany | 32 | 60 | 19 | 79 | +19 |
| Italy | 31 | 56 | 20 | 74 | +18 |
| France | 36 | 64 | 26 | 73 | +9 |
| Greece | 63 | 33 | 61 | 35 | +2 |

Source: Pew Research Center, Spring 2014 Global Attitudes Survey, Q15e.

Figure 4: Confidence in Putin Low Worldwide

How much confidence do you have in Russian President Putin to do the right thing regarding world affairs?



Source: Pew Research Center, Spring 2014 Global Attitudes Survey, Q41b.

Box 7: Inside Russia

The propaganda spread by the Kremlin during the Ukraine crisis has led Russians to adopt negative attitudes towards the EU. Yet although Russian citizens have become more sceptical of European values and norms, they did not change their minds overnight.

The anti-EU campaign began in February 2014 and reached its peak over the following two months, as President Yanukovich was deposed, Crimea annexed and the Donbass destabilised. News programmes increased in length and people tuned in for longer each evening, while Ukraine dominated the headlines. This had a decisive impact on perceptions of the conflict because over 80% of Russians receive their news from TV.

As pro-Kremlin narratives claimed that the EU triggered the Ukraine crisis by forcing Yanukovich to choose between East and West, the EU's image was severely damaged. Russians' perceptions of their country's relations with the EU changed dramatically, from decidedly positive in early 2013 to decidedly negative just a year and a half later. Indeed, the EU's standing fell even faster than that of the US. When Russians think of 'Europe', opinion polls show that they now think not only of 'neighbours and partners' (28%) but also of 'potential aggressors' (23%) and the 'guard of US policy on the Eurasian continent' (23%). This represents a threefold increase over the past ten years.

Most now agree that the West is hostile to Russia, and that this hostility is reflected in sanctions (55%) and an 'information war' against Russia (44%). One of the prime drivers of this hostility is thought to be the West's desire 'to seize Russia's natural resources' (41%). This myth has been repeated time and again in the media by figures such as Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Russian Security Council. It follows, then, that it would not be contrary to Russian interests if the EU collapsed: indeed, a Russian Public Opinion Research Centre (VCIOM) poll from July 2015 showed that 49% of Russians believed that EU disintegration was in Russia's interest, with just 24% believing the contrary.

Homosexuality is another issue that is exploited. When Vladimir Putin returned to power for a third term in 2012 (despite a wave of protests), his administration decided to build up its popularity on new ideological foundations. This campaign has manifested itself in a series of public attacks on LGBT rights. When a new law against 'gay propaganda' was passed amidst intense media coverage in June 2013, two-thirds of Russians feared that their children or grandchildren could become victims of such messaging. But when the media campaign subsided, so did parents' fears: by April 2015, fewer than half were similarly afraid.

Likewise, refugees are also taken advantage of. In September 2015, a majority of Russian poll respondents said that Europe should let them in. Five months later, however, most Russians believed that their country should not take refugees and 59% stated that Europe was not obliged to do so, either. Their attitudes almost certainly shifted as a result of a Moscow-driven propaganda campaign that portrayed refugees as dangerous sexual predators. All this has translated into a decline in support for the values that are seen to define the West. In one poll, taken during the height of the refugee crisis, 56% of respondents said that 'the European political values of freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights' were not important to them.

The main goal of Russia's strategic communications efforts in EaP states is to shape popular perceptions about the EU. This is facilitated by the language in which messages are communicated, the relative popularity of Russian media and social networks, the existence of sizeable Russian-speaking minorities, the attractiveness of Putin's leadership style, the aggressive promotion of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as a viable alternative to the EU, and people's general receptiveness to conspiracy theories.

Additional enablers are the home-grown, anti-EU rhetoric of local elites and the apparent failures of allegedly pro-EU governing coalitions. According to the European Neighbourhood Barometer, the number of respondents in the east who view the EU in a negative light swelled from 13% in 2012 to 21% in 2014. Polls also revealed an increase (from 26% to 34%) of those who do not believe the EU is bringing stability and peace to the region. The EU's image suffered mostly in the less engaged countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus), but also in Georgia. In Ukraine and Moldova, even anti-Russian sections of the public or the political spectrum often adopt some of the Russian narratives about the EU.

Where pro-EU sentiment is stronger, Moscow works to continue or deepen existing divisions within societies. In Georgia, as memories of the 2008 war slowly fade, attitudes towards Russia and the EAEU are warming. According to polls conducted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), support for the EU has declined from above 80% in late 2013 to 61% in mid-2015. In line with Russia's messaging, fewer Georgians (from almost 60% in 2014 to 45% in 2015) now believe that integration with the EU brings benefits. The highly influential Georgian Orthodox Church also reinforces some of the Russian messaging which depicts the EU as a morally decadent entity that focuses excessively on LGBT rights. Yet despite the clearly conservative and often EU-sceptic opposition from the church in countries like Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, all of their governments adopted anti-discrimination laws – one of the EU's preconditions for visa-free travel.

According to the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), the number of people in Moldova who would vote against Moldova's accession to the EU grew from 18% in 2010 to 33% in 2015. If asked to choose, 42% of Moldovans would currently vote to join the EAEU and 39% would opt for EU membership. Anti-EU sentiment among Russian-speaking minorities is higher than average (between 60% and 70%). But in line with Russia's narratives, even many of those who support integration with the EU think the already signed Association Agreement between the EU and Moldova could still cause damage.

In Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent conflict in the Donbass have temporarily undermined Russia's appeal but have not destroyed it entirely. According to a Razumkov Centre poll, in the contest between integration projects, the EU still enjoys a clear (though slowly narrowing) lead over the EAEU – 57% compared to 16%. But there is also an equally clear regional divide: support in the west and centre of the country is highest (81% and 58%, respectively), while in the south and east, those opposed to joining the EU outnumber supporters (39% against 33% in the south and 45% versus 37% in the east).

The picture in the Western Balkans is somewhat mixed. A Gallup survey from 2014 showed that Serbian citizens believe Russia to be the country's leading donor, well ahead of the EU. However, taken together, the EU and its member states have spent €3.5 billion in the region since 2000. Russia has contributed hardly a tenth of this sum – mostly through loans rather than grants – and lags behind the US and even Japan.

Thanks to its size, its central location in the Western Balkans and the presence of large Serbian communities in neighbouring countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro in particular), Serbia serves as a major conduit of Russian influence on the media, political debates and public opinion in the wider region. Moscow's ability to impact domestic politics and society is therefore significant. Last autumn, for example, Montenegrin authorities blamed opposition protests on Russian meddling. Prime Minister Milo Đukanović then used the domestic divide between pro-Westerners and pro-Russians to lash out indiscriminately at all of his critics. Russia is also a key diplomatic ally of Republika Srpska's President Milorad Dodik, who has threatened to undermine the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Sociological surveys paint a clear picture. In December 2015, an Ipsos poll found that 72% of Serbia's citizens hold a positive view of Russia, whereas only 25% saw the EU and just 7% saw NATO in a positive light. Vladimir Putin is by far the most trusted foreign leader in Serbia, with one poll placing him ahead of Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić. The Republika Srpska is no different, and support tends to peak around highly publicised events: Russia's veto over the UN Security Council resolution calling Srebrenica a genocide (July 2015), President Putin's attendance at the military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Belgrade (October 2014), Russian aid after floods struck the country, or the humanitarian convoys sent to the Serbs in northern Kosovo (2011). By contrast, in January 2016, 47.3% of Montenegrins backed NATO membership compared to 37.1% against. Support for NATO is even higher in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (83%) but, as the country's accession is blocked, there is no pressing need for it to choose between Moscow and the West.

Russia's capability of winning hearts and minds in the region does not necessarily give it leverage over government policy. Serbia is, yet again, a case in point. Prime Minister Vučić has strengthened ties with the West by pursuing EU membership and deepening cooperation with NATO. Nevertheless, Belgrade, Skopje and Sarajevo (because of the Republika Srpska) refused to support EU sanctions against Russia and are keen to reap the economic dividends from continued ties with Moscow. By contrast, Montenegro, aiming for speedy integration into NATO and the EU, implemented and backed the restrictive measures. Even though the country has seen high levels of Russian investment – in the industrial sector, tourism and real estate – its leadership clearly supports integration with the West. Elsewhere in the region, especially in Albania, Russian influence is negligible.

Just like their governments, citizens in most Western Balkan countries would prefer to have their cake and eat it, too: integrating into the EU without turning their back on Russia. In the end, however, there is a strong preference for the EU. Even in Serbia, opinion polls show that a great majority would rather live, work and study in Western Europe than in Russia. What the EU lacks is Russia's emotional appeal, rooted in a common cultural sense of belonging and a shared sense of victimhood at the hands of the West.

TABLE 3: EU DELEGATIONS' PRESENCE ON TWITTER AND FACEBOOK IN EaP COUNTRIES

| Country | Twitter | Facebook |
|------------|---|--|
| Armenia | 140 tweets (8 in Armenian); 2 512 followers | 52 posts (50 in Armenian); 18,076 likes |
| Azerbaijan | N/A | 18 posts (11 in Azeri); 16,948 likes |
| Belarus | N/A | 27 posts (20 in Belarusian, 5 in Russian); 2,949 likes |
| Georgia | 20 tweets; 941 followers | 16 posts (14 in Georgian); 20,720 likes |
| Moldova | N/A | 24 posts (3 in Romanian, 1 in Russian); 4 396 likes |
| Ukraine | 227 tweets (95 in Ukrainian, 6 in Russian); 6,181 followers | 96 posts (62 in Ukrainian, 5 in Russian); 16,613 likes |
| Russia | 85 tweets (77 in Russian); 2 190 followers | 50 posts (all in Russian); 8,838 likes |

Month reviewed: 18 March to 18 April 2016

TABLE 4: EU DELEGATIONS' PRESENCE ON TWITTER AND FACEBOOK IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

| Country | Twitter | Facebook |
|------------------------|--|--|
| Albania | 527 tweets (33 in Albanian); 2 967 followers | 148 posts (92 in Albanian); 10,808 likes |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 320 tweets (82 in Bosnian); 5,943 followers | 47 posts (all in Bosnian); 20,146 likes |
| Montenegro | 126 tweets (64 in Montenegrin); 1,328 followers | 48 posts (all in Montenegrin); 2,763 likes |
| Kosovo | 22 tweets (3 in Serbian, 3 in Albanian); 4,308 followers | 30 posts (2 in Serbian); 20,219 likes |
| Serbia | 228 tweets (178 in Serbian); 9,074 followers | 49 posts (48 in Serbian); 11,342 likes |

Month reviewed: 18 March to 18 April 2016

Box 8: The East StratCom Task Force

In 2015, the EU created an East StratCom Task Force focusing on Russian disinformation based in the European External Action Service (EEAS). It consists of nine full-time communications experts, most of them with Russian language skills. As the team members are from the EU institutions or seconded by member states, the Task Force is budget-neutral.

The June 2015 EU Action Plan on Strategic Communication set the goals to improve the EU's capacities for effective communications and forecasting, addressing and responding to external disinformation activities, as well as strengthening the overall media environment in the eastern neighbourhood. In this spirit, the Task Force seeks to explain key policy areas and create a positive EU narrative through strategic communications campaigns focusing on the EU's actions in the region, unveiling and de-constructing conspiracy theories, and countering disinformation. It concentrates its activities mainly on the EU's eastern neighbours rather than the member states themselves. In order to bridge cultural gaps, the Task Force individually tailors action plans for each target country and assists the EEAS and EU delegations by optimising the communication of their work in the region.

The Task Force releases a 'Disinformation Review' and a 'Disinformation Digest' on a weekly basis. These offer a systematic overview of cases of disinformation and highlight broader media trends. They are promoted through a Twitter account (@EUvsDisinfo) with nearly 7,000 followers generating 500,000 tweet impressions per month. Moreover, the EEAS has recently started publishing press releases in Russian and in February launched a Russian language website which averages 190,000 unique page views per month, or 25% of the total traffic to the EEAS website. In future, the Task Force aims to upgrade its activities from a tactical to strategic level, in order to increase its cooperation with EU delegations and the European Commission, and to pool existing resources more efficiently.

Responses to Russian disinformation by others

In July 2015, the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) released a report assessing the feasibility of countering disinformation in the Russian language media space. Faced with the appeal and wide diffusion of Russian broadcasting throughout the eastern neighbourhood, the report proposes a series of measures aimed at increasing the quality and dissemination of well-balanced independent media reporting in the region. This includes the establishment of a regional news hub, a centre for media excellence and a basket fund.

The Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) has launched the 'Information Warfare Initiative'. Led by regional experts, it seeks to collect, analyse and rebut Russian disinformation disseminated in central and eastern European media. It has an active online presence, conducts media monitoring, organises workshops and produces policy recommendations.

The website Stopfake.org was launched in March 2014 by staff and alumni of the Kiev-based Mohyla School of Journalism and is supported by a network of journalists, translators and experts. It is dedicated to fact-checking and refuting disinformation in international media coverage on Ukraine.

II. NATO'S STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

The Russian occupation of Crimea was described by NATO Supreme Allied Commander Philip Breedlove as perhaps 'the most amazing blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare'. However, the Alliance's concern about (dis)information campaigns and what is now called 'strategic communications' has a long history.

While not called strategic communications then, the threat of Soviet covert action subverting influence, intimidating domestic audiences and undermining governing political structures was very real in Western Europe throughout the Cold War. Communist propaganda increased after the creation of the Cominform (Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties) in 1947. Its establishment made it possible for the Soviet Union, its satellite states in Eastern Europe and communist parties in Western Europe to coordinate their information and propaganda efforts and to exploit the divisions between countries in the West.

The concern over Soviet propaganda and influence led several countries in the West to establish their own information and (counter-)propaganda organisations. However, many Western European countries were reluctant to enter into any close cooperation on matters of intelligence – even with close neighbours and allies – and preferred to keep intelligence under national control.

The NATO Information Service (NATIS) – which roughly corresponds to today's Public Diplomacy Division – was founded in 1950. Its main job during the Cold War was to promote NATO among the member states' publics but not to directly engage in anti-communist propaganda. Support for NATO was particularly weak in countries with large and well-organised communist parties. With only a small proportion of the population aware of what NATO was and how it functioned, it was feared that communist propaganda could exploit this widespread lack of knowledge and undermine the defence efforts of the alliance as a whole. NATIS coordinated work done by member governments in this field, and also produced its own information material (posters, pamphlets, lectures and seminar series, films, and travelling exhibitions). However, a lack of enthusiasm from many member governments and the absence of a dedicated budget forced NATIS to rely on irregular national contributions, thereby limiting its work. In fact, several European NATO countries resisted greater centralisation and information sharing efforts, believing instead that each state should remain free to tailor its (counter-)propaganda activities to national requirements and needs.

Box 9: Radio days

While the internet and social media are today's weapons of choice in the current war of words and ideologies, radio was the key tool used in the past. Radio broadcasts, just like the internet today, could directly address the population in 'enemy-controlled' territories.

Believing that the Cold War was as much a battle for the hearts and minds of the people as it was a contest of hard power, the US dedicated significant resources to counter-information and propaganda. Able to reach beyond the Iron Curtain, radio broadcasts made alternative information and ideas available to people in the East and helped to undermine public support for communist regimes. According to academic studies, as much as half of the adult population in Eastern Europe and a third of adults in urban areas in the Soviet Union listened to Western radio broadcasts.

Radio Free Europe (RFE), Radio Liberty (RL), and Voice of America (VoA) were all set up in the early phases of the Cold War by the US government and drew on the skills and Russian language knowledge of Central and Eastern European *émigrés*. These radio stations provided an alternative to local official media in Eastern Europe for communist and non-communist elites, as well as the general population at large – in their own language. The programmes focused on local news not covered by state-controlled domestic media, as well as religion, science, sports, Western music and literature banned by the local regimes. RFE and RL also gave a voice to the opposition movements that would later emerge as leaders of the new post-communist democracies.

After the end of the Cold War, RFE/RL gradually scaled down their broadcasts directed towards Eastern Europe. At the same time, several new broadcast services were launched as a response to the breakup of Yugoslavia: in Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian in early 1994, in Albanian (broadcasting to Kosovo) in 1999, and in Macedonian and Albanian (to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) in 2001.

Broadcasts to the greater Middle East began in Arabic (to Iraq) and in Persian (to Iran) in 1998. In 2002, broadcasts in Dari and Pashto (to Afghanistan) resumed, after having already been aired throughout the 1980s during the Soviet occupation. Also in 2002, RL revived broadcasts in local languages to the North Caucasus that had been suspended since the 1960s. In 2010, RFE/RL began broadcasting in local Pashto dialects to the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to provide an alternative to jihadist radio stations.

Back to the future?

The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom CoE) has been operational since January 2014. Based in Riga, the centre values strategic communications as a tool to achieve both its political and military objectives. NATO StratCom CoE has 23 staff members, roughly split between administrative staff and experts. These staff members come from – and coordinate with – the civilian, military, private and academic sectors to support and further NATO’s communications processes. In addition to publishing analysis, including occasional reports and a bi-annual peer-reviewed journal, Defence Strategic Communications, NATO StratCom CoE uses modern technologies and virtual tools to provide practical support to the alliance.

According to the StratCom CoE website, in 2015, the centre’s main activities were to:

- Support the development of a NATO Military Committee strategic communications policy and doctrine;
- Research how to identify early indications of a hybrid warfare scenario;
- Develop the Defence Strategic Communications academic journal;
- Study Russia’s information campaign against Ukraine;
- Research how NATO and its members could protect themselves from subversive tactics;
- Research 10 years of ISAF strategic communications efforts in order to extract best practices and lessons learned;
- Analyse the implementation of NATO’s strategic communications policy throughout the NATO Command Structure;
- Research the implementation of strategic communications within allied nations;
- Research ISIL’s information campaign and its influence on NATO countries’ societies;
- Develop an online introductory strategic communications course for senior officials, as well as basic and advanced courses for international staff officers;
- Support NATO StratCom training and education, including exercise education;
- Study how social media is being used as a weapon in hybrid warfare.

To date, NATO is not known to have launched a strategic communications campaign against ISIL.

III. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE SOUTH

The so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has quickly gained a strong reputation with regard to its strategic communications. Not only *what* it communicates, but also *how* – with its slick magazines and videos, and effective use of social media – has redefined the way in which political messages are being relayed in conflict. ISIL’s strategic communications are tailored to several audiences, ranging from international opponents who are susceptible to the idea of a ‘clash of civilisations’, to active members of ISIL and potential recruits. But ultimately, all of them are tied into the organisation’s long-term political project: ensuring its own survival, ideally with the most territory possible under its control.

To this effect, the purpose of ISIL’s strategic communications is fourfold:

- To portray itself as an effective organisation (both militarily and in terms of governance);
- To attract and retain recruits;
- To explain its ideology;
- To instil fear in and polarise societies.

In this sense, ISIL’s messaging has been both consistent and truly strategic.

ISIL’s grand narrative(s)...

ISIL’s narrative draws on several sources to craft its messages, creatively combining Islamic religious texts, conspiracy theories in which Muslims are the subjects of Western oppression, as well as ‘underdog’ and youth culture narratives. The resulting brand has been dubbed ‘jihadi cool’, or as sympathiser ‘Bint Chaos’ put it on her blog:

‘Jihadis look cool – like ninjas or video game warriors – gangstah and thuggish even – the opposition doesn’t.’ Team CVE [a reference to Countering Violent Extremism] consists ‘mostly [of] middleaged white guys with a smidgin of scared straight ex-mujahids [ex-jihadists] and a couple middleaged women. (...) Jihadis have cool weapons. And cool nasheeds [a cappella hymns]...’ She continues by stating that they also have ‘young fiery imams that fight on the battlefield’, whereas Team CVE ‘has ancient creaky dollar scholars... [S]alafi-jihadism made being pious cool. It became cool to quote aya [verse] and study Quran. And CVE has absolutely no defense against this. ... I love jihadi cant—dem,

bait, preeing, binty, akhi [brother]... its like Belter dialect in the Expanse. And it borrows from all languages—because jihad draws from all races and ethnicities. The voice of youth counterculture and revolution for an underclass. Like ghetto culture in the US — the inexorable evolution of cool.³

ISIL's narrative rests essentially upon six elements which are used roughly in equal measure. Although the brutality element is the one which is most frequently cited in international media, its other themes of mercy, victimhood, war, belonging, and utopia feature just as much, if not more.³

The use of brutality represents triumphalism and acts as a show of power. As it is designed largely with Arab and 'local' audiences in mind, the depiction of harsh punishments for alleged spies and traitors aims to discourage all forms of collaboration with the enemy. The beheading and crucifixion of soldiers in Mosul, for instance, greatly contributed to the desertion of parts of the Iraqi military. As a side effect, it also instils fear into potential adversaries outside of its territory.

This is mirrored by the mercy that ISIL demonstrates in other videos, where repentance is rewarded. Together, these two themes convey the message that ISIL is harsh yet just, and that whether an individual is subjected to brutality or mercy is a consequence of his or her actions.

At the same time, ISIL uses a narrative of victimhood to justify its 'resistance' and 'retaliation' against the 'Zionist-Crusader' complex, which it claims is waging a global war on Islam. Examples ranging from the creation of Middle Eastern states by colonial powers to the occupations of Palestine or Iraq all play into this part of its myth-making.

This somewhat paradoxically ties into the next theme: war, which serves to demonstrate ISIL's military capabilities. Despite the fact that it claims to face a global anti-Muslim conspiracy, ISIL promotes the message that it is an aggressive state that should be feared. Weapon types are frequently mentioned or military hardware displayed to showcase expertise, prestige and technical skills. An additional element is that war is reported on selectively and to ISIL's advantage. The group controls much of the information about its campaigns, since there are few independent journalists on the ground to provide audiences with an alternative, or to verify whether ISIL's reporting is indeed correct. Local news outlets, such as 'Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently' have to operate under highly dangerous circumstances. As a result, even its antagonists rely on ISIL material to report on its activities. That said, French media outlets recently began to label this material as 'propaganda', but the majority of it passes without ISIL being highlighted as the source.

3. Charlie Winter, *The Virtual Caliphate: Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy* (Quilliam Foundation, 2015).

This (dis)information bestows an immediate sense of belonging to an in-group with a specific set of religious grievances. Videos exhibiting camaraderie during and after combat, for instance, capture this sense of togetherness. It has been argued, however, that this element of inclusion is more important in ISIL's appeal to Western recruits than to 'local' audiences.

Finally, all these narratives are weaved together to form perhaps the most important theme: ISIL's utopian alternative. This projected utopianism is the key to understanding ISIL's appeal, as it reveals that the group does not merely aim to undermine the existing world order, but offer a constructive revolutionary alternative. And this alternative is not just theoretical: it allegedly already exists in its proclaimed caliphate, which, according to ISIL, is on a path to restoring the Islamic Golden Age of the eighth to thirteenth centuries.

... and target audiences

Each of ISIL's narratives outlined above serves a certain purpose and is tailored to a specific audience. Its goals are manifold, and range from rallying support to mobilising fighters, warning locals against collaboration with enemies, and provoking responses from local or international foes. It is worth noting that ISIL does not rely on strategic communications to raise funds – most of its financial resources come from activities inside its territories. These aims hint at the cyclical and self-reinforcing nature of the overall ISIL narrative, and its dependency on enemies to express their animosity towards the group both verbally and physically.

Four broad types of audiences are addressed, each in a different manner. The first target audience consists of the individuals living under direct ISIL control. These receive less electronic and more live messaging in the form of public film viewings, posters, announcements and leaflets. The primary purposes of these communications are to encourage cooperation and to prevent the emergence of opposition. In the territories under its control, ISIL has used both carrots and sticks: it has highlighted its ability to govern as much as it has regularly and publicly executed alleged spies and others defiant of its rule. Brutality is therefore chiefly employed for this type of audience, along with mercy or justice.

Audiences outside ISIL's territory are reached mostly through electronic means. However, it tailors its messages depending on the target and goals.

The second target audience is Muslims across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The messages are often in Arabic and serve the purposes of recruiting fighters and garnering local support in order to expand ISIL activities into third countries.

Around half of ISIL's foreign fighters are Arabs (6,000 from Tunisia, 2,500 from Saudi Arabia, 2,000 from Jordan, 1,500 from Morocco, 1,000 from Egypt to name the top senders), whereas its 'national' component is from Iraq and Syria. This makes it a pre-

dominantly Arab organisation in spite of its international claims. But recruitment is no longer ISIL's main goal with regard to Arab audiences – its communications strategy is instead designed to build up popular support rather than attract people to its territory. This is in line with its five year expansion plan covering the territory of the fifteenth century Abbasid Empire and beyond – an area which essentially includes most Muslim-majority countries in the MENA plus those previously under Ottoman or Arab control, such as Spain or the Balkans. Consequently, its focus has been to encourage the creation of local spinoffs (called ‘provinces’) in these areas. Some of these have been very active (such as in Egypt, Libya and Yemen), while others less so (in Algeria and Saudi Arabia).⁴

ISIL's third audience is non-Arab Muslims, with a focus on those in Europe, as well as in the former Soviet Republics. Together, these two regions make up the second-largest group of foreign fighters (after Arabs). For the time being, these groups are targeted mainly for recruitment purposes. The main messages relayed to them build on notions of utopia and belonging, although humanitarian purposes, war and justice can also be used (especially in individual-specific recruitment attempts). The main feature of European messaging is the creation of an alternative, utopian lifestyle in which the individual will find meaning, belonging and adventure. Most messages for this audience are spun in a positive rather than negative way, although life in Europe is occasionally portrayed as impossible for pious Muslims.

ISIL's fourth audience is its formal enemies – the ‘Zionist-Crusaders’ – which it needs in order to justify its existence. ISIL thus targets more than just a pool of potential recruits, and the function of its messaging is not solely radicalisation. It also relies on reactions from enemies and propagates an apocalyptic view of an inevitable clash between Muslim and non-Muslim civilisations in order to have a reason to exist. Applauding the terrorist attacks on Paris and Brussels, threatening other European cities, and beheading Western journalists all have the function of projecting ISIL as an opponent of Western states – not only in the eyes of its own declared enemies, but also in the eyes of its supporters. Without an enemy, ISIL has no reason to fight, and consequently no leverage to attract recruits and individuals wishing to be a part of its political project. As ISIL's narrative revolves around being a valiant underdog, the organisation needs a strong opponent perhaps more than anything else in order to exist.⁵

4. Although Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabab in Somalia have declared allegiance to ISIL, they have not been recognised as *wilayets* or administrative subunits by ISIL's central command.

5. For more information on ISIL and Palestine, see Samar Batrawi, ‘Understanding ISIS's Palestine Propaganda’, Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network, 30 March 2016.

Box 10: ISIL in Palestine


The Palestinian question is an example of a political issue that ISIL co-opts in its grand narrative, transforming it from one based on political grievances to a religious clash of civilisations. Matters related to Palestine feature frequently in ISIL publications. They include the standard of living in Gaza and the casualties inflicted by Israel, but also the illegitimacy of the Hamas leadership. ISIL also makes frequent use of religious symbols in Jerusalem, with the al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock often featured in videos and statements. It usually refers to Jerusalem not as *al-Quds*, as most Palestinians and Arabs do, but as *bayt al-maqdis* (the holy house). The term features often in the Hadiths, and is generally seen as carrying a clearly religious connotation. In doing so, ISIL attempts to usurp the Palestinian issue into its own narrative, even directly challenging Palestinian conceptions of the conflict. For example, one ISIL statement reads: ‘Your struggle is not about land, but about right versus wrong. It’s about religion.’ The idea promoted is that Jerusalem will only truly be liberated when it is governed by Muslims according to Islamic law.

The underlying reasons for this co-optation may be religious or strategic – or indeed both – in nature, since ensuring Muslim control over Islamic holy places is key to ISIL’s agenda. But the Palestinian issue also seems to play well with some of ISIL’s target audiences. Given that 88% of Palestinians perceive ISIL to be a radical organisation, the group tends not to use the Palestinian question for recruitment purposes among Palestinians. Instead, Palestine is part of a list of Muslim (rather than Arab) grievances which will supposedly be resolved by ISIL in the long term.

ISIL’s *modus operandi*

ISIL’s communication tactics are creative and make use of modern technology, particularly when it comes to audiences outside of its territory. It is important to note, however, that not all ISIL propaganda is produced by the organisation itself. Instead, its strategic communications have moved from a vertical to a horizontal approach towards messaging. Entities such as the Al-Hayat Media Centre remain at the core of its communications efforts, but fighters and sympathisers also produce content which is unlikely to be entirely under the control of ISIL’s central command. Nevertheless, this communication style is ultimately to ISIL’s advantage as it is faster and more flexible. Personal and official messages thus become blurred: a video produced by a European sympathiser will, for example, be disseminated among other sympathisers without any effort required from the organisation. This resonates particularly well with European jihadists who operate in a less hierarchical environment than their Arab counterparts.

Figure 5: ISIL's online output



The diagram above depicts the basic structure of ISIL's online output. The examples listed here are not exhaustive, but serve to illustrate the different branches of the network. Statements and videos published through these channels are often further disseminated through websites and forums such as the Shumukh al-Islam platform.

Outside the territory under its control, ISIL has used different ways to reach its audiences. Social media, in particular, has become a battleground for ISIL – in part because it is difficult for governments to control. Social media platforms struggle with moni-

toring their users, but banning them does not prevent them from returning under a different alias. This ‘whack-a-mole’ game that ISIL has played on Twitter and elsewhere means the organisation can never fully be blocked – but its life can be made more difficult. Twitter, for instance, repeatedly shuts down jihadist accounts, and closed some 125,000 of them between mid-2015 and spring 2016. Although this does not stop ISIL operatives or sympathisers from returning, it does affect their impact to a modest extent as it takes time to accumulate followers.

ISIL uses these online forums mainly for recruitment and to gain support, but these are highly individualised approaches in terms of both senders and receivers. The numbers of ISIL accounts on Twitter are debatable: while some studies put it at 50,000, not all have the same function. Some generate content (about 1,000), while others are designed to retweet or to promote new accounts of users which had previously been suspended. But ISIL has found other ways in which to maximise its Twitter impact. A specially designed application named The Dawn of Glad Tidings connected ISIL’s communications department to supporters who would automatically retweet its messages – but in a way that would defy Twitter’s spam-detection algorithm. That way, ISIL managed to send 40,000 messages a day until Google Play was able to remove the app from its store three months later.

Most of ISIL’s Twitter users are located in Syria and Iraq or in contested territories rather than in Europe or the US, with 80% of their messages sent in Arabic and 20% in English or other languages. However, these users only interact with each other rather than gathering new supporters – the medium therefore serves more as a meeting place than a megaphone.

By contrast, Facebook (or similar websites) are mainly used for recruitment. Because the network’s features actively connect people who express sympathy for posts (via a ‘Like’ button), it allows for the identification of even passive users as sympathisers. More importantly, ISIL uses sites in the ‘dark web’ to connect with supporters and spread its propaganda. These hidden websites and forums are difficult to access and are less traceable than Facebook or Twitter accounts, posing a problem for security services.

But ISIL also uses broader, less personalised modern methods such as videos. Apart from films of brutal beheadings that are designed to project power and instil fear, ISIL also has more benign videos. They typically show glorified clips of young men firing weapons, laughing or praying together – a depiction of the aforementioned utopian narrative. The videos are often narrated by a native English or French speaker, and accompanied by Quranic songs. Videos are also used to comment on events such as the terrorist attacks in Brussels, or to threaten certain audiences.

While the cutting and editing of these videos has been lauded as professional, they can be easily produced with applications such as iMovie. ISIL also uses computer game imagery or references in its videos – just as it has made use of computer games themselves. It has modified popular games such as Grand Theft Auto 5 and ARMA 3 so that users can play as ISIL fighters or kill Western civilians and police. It is worth noting that

modifying such games is in itself not innovative and not particularly difficult to do. However, it points to a certain age group of both the author and target, and contributes to the creation of ‘jihadi cool’ as a brand.

ISIL also uses more traditional methods of communication such as magazines and declarations. *Dabiq* magazine is its main printed publication and was first published in July 2014. It has been published at varying intervals, with the 14th issue released in April 2016. Named after the Syrian town where it is believed that the final battle leading to the apocalypse will take place, it features doctrinal articles, comments on political events, portraits of fallen fighters, depictions of life under ISIL rule and news from the frontline. It is published in PDF format, and is designed to resemble a glossy magazine. It is regularly available in English and Arabic, and certain issues have also been translated into other languages.⁶

Lastly, ISIL also issues declarations on events it considers important – such as the Paris or Brussels attacks – through its official channels. It uses religious language in these declarations to bolster its Islamic credentials, and translates them into several languages.

Counter-narratives in Arabic

Although ISIL often emphasises its appeal to all Muslims as well as its Islamic roots, it does not enjoy overwhelming support in the Muslim or Arab world.⁷ In fact, there are many counter-narrative campaigns against ISIL in Arabic. Satire and theological discussions are the two most prevalent forms of counter-narrative.

The most dynamic space within which Arabic language counter-narratives are taking place is on YouTube. Not only can individual activists upload content, but official television stations in the Arab world also publish their shows on the free platform, meaning that the content is both diverse and easily accessible. Satire is the most prominent form of counter-narrative, with both official state-led television channels and activists engaged in the use of irony or sarcasm to undermine the core elements of ISIL’s message. For example, the Iraqi Media Foundation produced a satirical programme called ‘The State of Superstition’ (a word play on ‘The Islamic State’), which mainly tackles the themes of brutality and mercy. The programme’s episodes have been viewed up to 900,000 times, with the most watched one featuring a trial of popular animated character ‘SpongeBob Squarepants’.

6. For a full list of media offices and branches see Charlie Winter, *The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy* (Quilliam Foundation, 2015), p.14.

7. For example, in this Pew Research Center poll of 11 countries, all except Pakistan had between 41-99% ‘very unfavorable’ views of ISIL, with 19% of Pakistani respondents answering ‘very unfavorable’ and 62% of respondents refusing to submit an answer. See <http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/11/17/views-of-isis-topline/>

Another influential video is a specific episode of the Palestinian television show *Watan A Watar* (Homeland on a Thread), which generally serves as a critique of Palestinian society and politics. The episode in question mocks the brutality and mercy administered at an ISIL checkpoint, and received just under two million views and extensive coverage in the English language press.

Examples of other counter-narratives include a series of powerful animated movies created by local activists in Syria. One of them entitled 'No Difference' shows how both ISIL and the Assad regime make use of the same violent methods, and are therefore both as bad as each other. Finally, in another video entitled 'ISIS 2080', ISIL fighters nostalgically narrate what life was like before ISIL: electricity, running water, cars, planes, freedom, and even Islam are named as relics from a distant past. The message is that reversing modernity is not desirable, and that the alternative offered by ISIL is in fact a dystopia.

Theological discussions also constitute an important counter-narrative, as intra-Salafi debates about the legitimacy of ISIL have led to a number of high-profile religious figures such as Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Adnan al-Aroor, Safar al-Hawali, Muhammad al-Arefe, and many others publishing statements and videos which criticise ISIL on theological grounds. Muhammad al-Arefe, for example, is a high-profile religious scholar from Saudi Arabia with a vast following, including more than 690,000 subscribers on YouTube. He often dedicates his Friday sermon to the Syrian conflict, and has criticised ISIL's use of *takfir* (accusing another Muslim of apostasy, and using this as a justification for violence against them). Islamic scholars and leaders from around the world also released an open letter denouncing ISIL, addressed to the group's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

These Arabic-language counter-narratives could help Europeans understand how certain content and styles are received by Arabic-speaking audiences. The wider problems surrounding the credibility of external counter-narrative campaigns still remain, as does the question of how European initiatives should deal with the fact that engaging with 'local' counter-narratives inevitably means engaging with indigenous visions for the future of the Middle East – most of which are focused on reconstructing or dismantling existing elite-based power-structures and fulfilling demands that the international community has thus far viewed as secondary to stability.

Counter-narratives in English and other languages

The establishment of counter-narratives has also been one of the elements of international policy towards ISIL. These serve a dual purpose: on the one hand, from a broader strategic perspective, they serve to discredit ISIL's grand narrative. On the other hand, there is a more immediate tactical element to these campaigns, which is to counter the potentially radicalising effects of ISIL's media output.

Box 11: Open letter to al-Baghdadi

One of the most powerful theological counter-narratives against ISIL is an open letter to its leader which was originally published in Arabic in 2014 and still remains open for signature by any religious leader or scholar who wishes to do so. The list of 175 signatories to date includes the Grand Mufti of Egypt and the vice-president of Al-Azhar University. Some of its most important criticisms of ISIL are:

- The ‘cherry-picking’ of Quranic verses as the basis for legal arguments and *fatwas*, doing so without mastery of the Arabic language, with a gross oversimplification of sharia law and ignorance of contemporary reality;
- Killing innocent people, emissaries, ambassadors, diplomats, aid workers, and journalists, all of which is forbidden according to Islam;
- Misuse of jihad without the right cause, purpose and rules of conduct;
- The declaration of people as non-Muslim (*takfir*), and mistreating in any way ‘people of the scripture’, which includes Yazidis;
- Forcible conversion, torture, and the disfiguration of the dead in the name of God;
- Denying the rights of women and children;
- Executing legal measures without the correct procedures to ensure justice and mercy;
- The declaration of a caliphate without the consensus of all Muslims.

Although powerful and important, this letter is also part of a potentially endless toing and froing, where both sides reject each other’s claims on the basis that their opponent does not represent ‘true Islam’. Additionally, some of the individuals and groups which denounce ISIL more generally on religious grounds are not necessarily ones with which the EU would wish to be associated, such as the Taliban, Hamas, or Hizbullah. Counter-narratives must therefore tread carefully in this highly politicised landscape.

The existing counter-narrative campaigns are not organised by a single overarching institution or initiative, and although the coalition fighting ISIL has sought to coordinate its efforts (at least in theory), these have not worked as well as had been hoped. Furthermore, states that do not participate in the operation are excluded from such streamlining efforts. In Europe, both the EU and its member states have launched strategic communications campaigns against ISIL. The EU’s efforts have focused on two different theatres of operation: the first in the MENA region, and the second in Europe.

The first project, launched at an EU home affairs ministerial meeting in January 2015, right after the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, is the Belgian-British Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team (SSCAT), financed by the European Commission. The team, staffed entirely by nationals from these two countries, seeks to provide an advisory service to

member states interested in developing their own strategic communications capacity to address national domestic communications challenges. This work was intended to focus particularly on the departure of European nationals and residents to Syria, but has grown to also include Islamophobia and the resurgence of the far right and left, particularly in relation to the migration crisis.

At the project's inception in January 2015, the power of communications in radicalising – but also in protecting – citizens was not well understood. SSCAT has established a network of professionals representing 26 member states who are able to exchange experiences and monitor developments in the way ISIL and other extremist groups (including far-right and far-left organisations) can exploit communications to radicalise and recruit European citizens. The first phase of the project will close in July 2016, giving way to a second phase which will focus on bolstering the research capabilities available to the SSCAT network and building partnerships between governments, civil society, EU institutions and the private sector. The intended result of SSCAT's work is a strong partnership across Europe that can challenge radical content and reinforce the overwhelmingly positive narratives that exist across Europe and its member states but which, at present, are marginalised by the pace and scale of communications from ISIL and other extremist groups.

One such example, although SSCAT was not involved in it, is France's 'Stop Djihadisme' website, which contains information about ISIL. It also offers a counter-narrative to it – most notably a powerful video directly challenging a typical ISIL clip called *Ils te disent* ('they tell you'). By the end of the pilot project in July 2016, SSCAT will have delivered bespoke communications advice to 15 member states and created a network of 26 member states sharing communications best practices.

Preventing radicalisation and generating positive narratives have been the cornerstones of Europe's approach. Rather than responding to ISIL's narratives directly, the EU develops a separate, positive message highlighting the importance of mutual understanding and respect. It also highlights the role of economic development and the EU's contributions to it. In that sense, it is not counter-messaging, but proactive messaging.⁸

In December 2015, the European Commission appointed coordinators to combat anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim hatred. The key task of the two coordinators is to inform the Commission about the specific concerns of the respective communities (for which they act as contact points), while contributing to the development of its overarching strategy to combat hate crime, hate speech, intolerance and discrimination. They also liaise with the member states, the European Parliament, other institutions, relevant civil society organisations and academia.

8. More details available in Patryk Pawlak, 'EU strategic communication with the Arab world', European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) Briefing, European Union, May 2016.

Box 12: The Arab StratCom Task Force

At its February 2015 Foreign Affairs Council, the EU expressed its commitment to ‘improving its strategic communication, developing an outreach strategy to the Arab world, including developing counter-narratives to terrorist propaganda, promoting fundamental rights, and taking into account the increasingly frequent use of the internet in radicalisation, engaging through social media and enhancing communication in Arabic’. In response, an inter-institutional Arab StratCom Task Force was set up to tackle the phenomenon of radicalisation in the Arab world through public diplomacy and communications work. The Task Force seeks to foster dialogue and cultivate mutual respect between Arabic-speaking and European communities, especially among their youth. It is chaired by the EEAS Strategic Communications Division and is made up of representatives from EEAS geographical departments, the Council’s Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, and all relevant Commission DGs, including the Spokesperson’s Service. It promotes EU policies and projects in the region and coordinates closely with the EU delegations in order to strengthen existing ties and highlight shared values.

Unlike the East StratCom Task Force, the Arabic-language Task Force has no dedicated staff and does its work using existing resources. It decided not to adopt a top-down approach with a single narrative to cover the whole region but rather to operate on the ground in the countries themselves via EU delegations instead, some of which already carry out significant work in this area. In June 2015, the Task Force produced an advisory report which fed into the HR/VP’s contribution to the European Council with an initial set of 30 recommendations. Since then, the Task Force has met regularly with a view towards mapping existing outreach and communications tools, developing a business plan, implementing some of the June recommendations, and assessing resources and scope for action. Indeed, the EEAS has considerably increased the press and information budget for delegations in the Arab world this year. Efforts have focused on strengthening their social media presence in the region, creating translation hubs, polling young people to establish their concerns and to explore which narratives would work best where, and establishing a number of pilot outreach projects.

The work of the Task Force complements a number of other, similar activities, including the project ‘Strengthening community resilience to radicalisation and recruitment – MENA’, funded by the European Commission Service for Foreign Policy Instruments through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), launched in late 2015 in Tunisia. This was reportedly born out of a conversation between the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and his Tunisian counterpart, and consists of a series of video clips, as well as localised approaches with NGOs working against radicalisation. A similar project is planned in Lebanon in cooperation with the Sunni Muslim Dar al-Fatwa. The EEAS Stratcom Division also participates in the regular teleconferences of the Communications Cell of the Global Coalition against ISIL and receives the Cell’s daily media review.

The US, for its part, appointed a Special Envoy and Coordinator for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications in 2015, who also heads the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism (created in 2011 but expanded in 2015). The Center aims to coordinate all existing attempts at counter-messaging by other federal institutions, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security and US intelligence agencies. The envoy, Rashad Hussain, presented a strategy in June 2015 emphasising the importance of coordinating messaging against terrorist entities such as ISIL. But frustration over the generally slow response to ISIL's media campaign led Richard A. Stengel, the State Department's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, to voice the conclusion that the media war against ISIL has effectively already been lost.

TABLE 5: EU DELEGATIONS' PRESENCE ON TWITTER AND FACEBOOK IN THE MENA REGION

| Country | Twitter | Facebook |
|-------------------------|---|---|
| Algeria | N/A | 15 posts (14 in French, 1 in Arabic); 5,353 likes |
| Egypt | 57 tweets (3 in Arabic); 397 followers | 31 posts (11 in Arabic); 42,286 likes |
| GCC/Saudi Arabia | 87 tweets (10 in Arabic); 1,341 followers | N/A |
| Iraq | N/A | N/A |
| Israel | 30 tweets (1 in Hebrew); 2,292 followers | 13 posts (8 in Hebrew); 11,608 likes |
| Jordan | 109 tweets (30 in Arabic); 493 followers | 24 posts (all in Arabic); 41,649 likes |
| Lebanon | 49 tweets (6 in Arabic); 2,621 followers | 21 posts (5 in Arabic, 1 in French); 11,205 likes |
| Libya | 17 tweets (3 in Arabic); 9,919 followers | 13 posts (4 in Arabic); 21, 948 likes |
| Morocco | 64 tweets (32 in French, 11 in Arabic) 8,756 followers | 14 posts (12 in French, 11 in Arabic); 6,502 likes |
| Palestinian Territories | 23 tweets (2 in Arabic); 630 followers | 15 posts (5 in Arabic); 126,010 likes |
| Syria | N/A | N/A |
| Tunisia | 33 tweets (14 in French, 1 in Arabic); 562 followers | 20 posts (15 in French, 5 in Arabic); 17,382 likes |
| Turkey | 176 tweets (42 in Turkish, 6 in Arabic); 9,176 followers | 12 posts (8 in Turkish); 7,680 likes |
| UAE | 39 tweets (7 in Arabic); 850 followers | N/A |
| Yemen | 11 tweets (5 in Arabic); 1,265 followers | 5 posts (2 in Arabic); 2,984 likes |

Month reviewed: 15 March to 15 April 2016

Box 13: Islamic radicalism in the Western Balkans

Balkan countries are among Europe's top exporters of volunteers fighting for radical Islamic organisations such as ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra. The Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) estimates that over 300 fighters from Kosovo have travelled to war zones in Iraq and Syria, while 330 fighters have come from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 110 from Albania, 100 from Macedonia, 50 from Serbia and 13 from Montenegro. Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are thus the top two European countries by percentage of the population that has joined terrorist organisations, while Albania is ranked fourth, just behind Belgium. It is also estimated that those who support radical Islamist movements in these countries outnumber actual volunteers by more than ten to one.

At the same time, radical interpretations of Islam are somewhat alien to Muslim communities in the Balkans, which are traditionally oriented towards the Hanafi school of thought on Sunni Islam. Furthermore, 50 years of communist rule in the region instilled a sense of secularism in Balkan Muslim communities, and gave rise to an Islamic tradition that is markedly different in its interpretations and practices to its more conservative counterparts in the Arabian Peninsula.

More conservative interpretations of Islam (such as the Hanbali school and the Salafist movement), as well as the religion's militant form ('Takfirism') first arrived in the Balkans in the early 1990s, when some 2,000 Arab *mujahedeen* fighters came to fight with Bosnian Muslims during the Yugoslav wars.

Although the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords decreed that foreign fighters should leave the country, around 600 men were granted citizenship by the Bosnian Muslim authorities. They are now largely found in isolated rural areas across Bosnia and Herzegovina, living in communities unintegrated with society at large. In a similar manner to Bosnia, armed conflict and instability in Kosovo (1998-1999) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2001) also attracted foreign fighters from Salafist movements.

Taking advantage of economic hardship and the profound failure of governments to improve living conditions, radical Islamic movements also began to provide public services ranging from help for the poor to supporting hospitals and schools. Meanwhile, radical imams began to provide counselling services akin to life coaching, and in some towns, dormitories opened up to provide accommodation to poor students and spread Salafist and Takfirist ideas.

Extremists are now increasingly moving their activities online for three main reasons. The first is that – in spite of the fact that Balkan countries lack infrastructure comparable to Western states – internet access is available even in the most remote rural areas. A study by the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies shows that 77% of Kosovo's rural population regularly uses the internet, which is one percentage point above the average for Kosovo as a whole.

Balkan states have recently passed new legislation or adapted existing regulations to combat terrorism, including the financing of terrorist activity. All have amended their criminal codes to make it illegal to participate in or organise travel to foreign

war zones. This has resulted in a growing number of arrests and prosecutions of those suspected of terrorism or of sending fighters to Syria and Iraq. Anti-money laundering legislation in all Western Balkan states now contains provisions to prevent the financing of terrorist organisations and, with the exception of Serbia, these countries have all adopted anti-terrorism strategies.

However, the anti-terrorism response by Western Balkan countries pays little or no attention to prevention. The implementation of community policing policies is still in its infancy, even though many years have passed since it was first introduced. There are also no studies on the causes, contributing factors, channels and scale of radicalisation or its potential consequences. Also lacking are mechanisms to link various central institutions (e.g. police forces) with local actors (schools, local authorities, sports centres) in order to enable the early detection of radicalisation and to provide assistance to those already on the path to becoming radicalised.

IV. EU STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: WHERE FROM, WHAT NEXT?

Over the past few years, the EU has been increasingly hit by destabilising messages that, in different forms and to different degrees, amount to coherent hostile ‘strategic communications’ campaigns. Those promoted and orchestrated by Russia (inside Russia itself, within the EU, and in European countries neighbouring both) have explicitly targeted the EU itself, its nature and its policies. Those carried out by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have been more ‘civilisational’ – i.e. aimed at European or Western values – and at the same time more personal, local and national, i.e. focused on specific situations of estrangement and marginalisation.

In both cases, however, ‘identity politics’ has played a key role, mirroring to some extent (and possibly reinforcing) similar approaches that have gained ground within the EU itself. Interestingly, Europe has been accused of simultaneously being ‘no longer Christian’ (by Russia) and a continent of ‘intolerant crusaders’ (by ISIL). Also of interest is that in both cases the West is portrayed as ‘decadent’, driven by values that undermine social cohesion and, indeed, a shared common identity. In both cases hostile and fundamentally illiberal messaging has been highly personalised and strongly emotional, often built on real or perceived grievances, and largely delivered through sophisticated techniques.

Last but certainly not least, both campaigns have played on the EU’s own weaknesses. It is difficult to deny that the Union’s ‘soft power’ has suffered considerably in recent times: internal divisions, inadequate policy delivery, and mounting populism have all contributed to creating an environment (even inside the EU itself) that is significantly more receptive to their messaging. This, in turn, further undermines Europe’s ‘soft power’ and, more generally, EU influence.

Both types of campaigning have indeed scored important points, both inside and outside the EU. Russia has successfully targeted both elites and significant minority groups frustrated with mainstream politics; its main emphasis has been on negative messaging and undermining the EU’s own narrative. For its part, ISIL has operated mainly below the radar and at a grassroots level, combining a religion-infused anti-Western rhetoric with a violence-inspired dystopia.

Needless to say, these ‘strategic communications’ campaigns have been accompanied by hostile operations, not just online and on air, but also on the ground. In both cases, these violent actions reinforced their promoters’ image of strength, but also generated opposition and outright rejection.

The EU's collective response was slow at first, but it has picked up speed recently. The Union does not engage in counter-propaganda, and a preference for (re)acting at the national level has long prevailed. Lately, the realisation that coordinated action at the EU level can actually make a considerable difference has gained ground, especially when the challenges are directed at the Union as a whole, know no borders, and cannot be tackled separately. As a result, a few limited initiatives have been launched and implemented – also through NATO – as reported and analysed in the previous chapters of this Report.

What follows is a tentative catalogue of action points that may be considered by EU policy-makers in order to enhance the effectiveness of the EU's own strategic communications. Some apply to both Russia and ISIL, while others are more customised and case-specific.

General approaches

If the rationale for (and the logic of) coordinating strategic communications at the EU level is to be further and efficiently implemented, especially in the Union's external action and in line with the EU institutions' declared priorities, a number of issues may have to be addressed.

To start with, any credible strategic communications effort – in both its defensive and offensive dimensions – needs to be built on research and analysis dissecting the problem(s), the audience(s), and the message(s), and has to be planned and implemented accordingly. All this requires adequate resources, in terms of funding as well as staff. However, this is not primarily or necessarily a matter of numbers.

The budgetary lines allocated by the EU to 'communications' – including but not limited to foreign policy and external relations – are indeed significant. Yet they are scattered among the various Commission Directorates-General and other institutions, with different areas of responsibility and competences, and are often spread out across a multitude of projects and mini-campaigns that are sometimes unprofessionally designed, run separately from one another, and occasionally carried out only to tick a required box. Moreover, EU delegations (as well as member state embassies, for that matter) have long 'done' communications half-heartedly, as a part-time activity and an afterthought. External communications and public diplomacy have become a key priority since the establishment of the EEAS, however.

The EU outsources part of its communications work to consultancies (e.g. strengthening web and social media communications). In some cases, however, this has translated into paraphrasing press releases rather than concentrating resources and know-how on a single coherent set of agreed common narratives. This is starting to change now, and much can be done at various levels to streamline expenditure and maximise output, thus going beyond the old patchwork of micro-initiatives and making the Union's external communications much more strategic. The forthcoming mid-term review of the

Multiannual Financial Framework may present an opportunity to consolidate communications efforts and budgets across the board.

Training and recruiting staff that is ‘fit for purpose’ is equally important. Simply publishing press releases or seeking media coverage (what insiders call ‘info-politik’) is clearly not enough when confronted with challenges of the scope and magnitude described here. Tailoring communications to particular environments and targets, and customising the EU’s rebuttals and own positive messaging to specific groups requires know-how that cannot be expected of officials who often have administrative and technical backgrounds. Regional analysts and media operators with relevant cultural and linguistic skills are essential in order to give substance and credibility to strategic communications. They could be employed as trainers for current EU officials, especially in EU delegations, but also as temporary/contract agents in the field and at headquarters in Brussels.

Accordingly, the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) could organise dedicated calls in order to create pools of experts (mid-career and at the higher grades) to draw upon in Brussels, the EU delegations, as well as CSDP missions and operations. In addition, the current EU rules for Seconded National Experts (SNEs) could be reviewed – or even simply amended – to make room for such specialised personnel, who should come not only from national bureaucracies but also the private sector, NGOs or academia (as is happening already, at least in part, with the East StratCom Task Force). Some decentralised EU agencies also have relevant know-how which cannot, however, be sufficiently mobilised due to outdated staff regulations. The currently ongoing EEAS internal review could factor in all of these considerations and devise appropriate, more flexible arrangements to facilitate the inclusion of relevant expertise.

In terms of method and style, the EU’s communications have often been faceless, anonymous, technocratic, unemotional, and reliant upon the expectation (or rather assumption) that facts will speak for themselves. This has started to change, with a greater emphasis on story-telling and the use of ‘real people’. Perceptions are no less important, and they can be shaped – as the examples of Russia and ISIL confirm. Re-shaping false perceptions and responding to outright lies or hoaxes does not require entering into a messy or dishonest contest with hostile opponents. That would not only be unacceptable for the EU but also, in all likelihood, be counterproductive. What is now being done with disinformation digests and reviews can in fact be extended and expanded to include outreach and dissemination efforts seeking to bring them to as many e-mail and Twitter accounts as possible, and in as many languages as necessary. TV, radio or even only YouTube-savvy rapid intervention teams can quickly develop storylines about major policy issues or unfolding crises, preferably infused with real life events and testimonies (rather than official figures and statements). Some possible examples include the domestic impact of Russia’s economic slowdown, the negative personal experiences of individuals under ISIL’s rule, or even the successful integration of migrants in certain EU countries.

Irony and satire could also be utilised to de-construct some hostile campaigns – but they will have to be handled with care and cultural sensitivity (after all, not every body

in the world knows, understands or likes Monty Python). All these features can then be translated and distributed among relevant publics via both social media and local community hubs, thus strengthening resilience to disinformation at the societal level. Internal guidelines could be drawn up and circulated across EU services, delegations and missions. A joint Commission-EEAS Communication (or even a dedicated common strategy) could be prepared in order to streamline existing activities and create appropriate synergies across the EU.

Specific approaches

All these suggestions are meant to rationalise and optimise the Union's overall external strategic communications. Yet they do not rule out more targeted approaches to specific situations. In fact, this is already happening in the east and the south, to some extent in the Western Balkans, and Central Asia should probably be included soon too. On the basis of the analysis presented here, it is also advisable to differentiate EU responses to hostile strategic communications campaigns. In this regard, the following points are worth considering:

In the case of Russia, the call for more common action (also via NATO) came relatively soon, driven by the realisation of the scale of the challenge and the need to join forces and resources.

In many respects, the East StratCom Task Force has exceeded expectations, with widespread knowledge of Russian inside EU administrations proving to be a key asset, and deserves to be strengthened. The products it has delivered so far could, for instance, be translated into all EU languages and distributed more systematically among EU citizens through media outlets, arguably also via the European Commission representations in the 28 member states. Translation and dissemination in Ukrainian and Serbian would also likely improve the effectiveness of the (significant) resources spent on EU communications in the Western Balkans.

Strengthening EU strategic communications in local languages in Eastern Partnership and Western Balkan countries is essential. Euronews could for example begin to broadcast in Romanian and Serbian as the two most important languages in the region where Russian messaging is most intrusive and effective. Finally, discreet but steady support for independent local media (also through professional training of local operators) could be intensified, building on the work already being done by the EED.

With regard to ISIL, although all member states feel similarly (if not equally) threatened, they have long preferred to act at the national level. They have only recently realised that the challenge concerns them all. However, the Arab StratCom Task Force is still comparatively under-equipped in terms of personnel and budget and lacks dedicated Arab-speaking seconded experts. Insufficient knowledge of Arabic – especially, though not exclusively, in Brussels – is also proving to be a serious problem that needs to be addressed.

ISIL may end up being a temporary or at least transient phenomenon, but jihadist radicalism itself may not. It is therefore crucial to focus on tackling radicalisation at large instead, and to avoid singling out Islam as its only source. Focusing purely on Islam is likely to antagonise (or neutralise) moderate Muslims further, both inside and outside the EU, which act as a crucial counterbalance to potentially radicalising groups. Similarly, engaging ISIL on religious grounds would be dangerous for the EU, as it would implicitly legitimise the organisation's Islamic credentials – which it uses to pursue a totalitarian agenda. It is also a battle that cannot be won with theological arguments, at least certainly not by the EU. Strategic communications efforts, however, could consider using only the term *Daesh* to refer to the group (as some member states are doing already), thus avoiding a direct reference to Islam, as well as undermining its credentials as a state.

Finally, counter-radicalisation cannot be achieved through strategic communications alone (nor military action or law enforcement, for that matter). The grievances that generated violent radicalism in the first place, both inside and outside the EU, will also have to be addressed, or at least some concrete efforts to that end will have to be seen and acknowledged by the wider public.

Annexes

ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|----------|--|
| BIRN | The Balkan Investigative Reporting Network |
| CSDP | Common Security and Defence Policy |
| DCFTA | Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement |
| DG | Directorate General |
| EaP | Eastern Partnership |
| EEAS | European External Action Service |
| EED | European Endowment for Democracy |
| EAEU | Eurasian Economic Union |
| HR/VP | High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission |
| IcSP | Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace |
| ISAF | International Security Assistance Force |
| ISIL | Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant |
| LGBT | Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender |
| MENA | Middle East and North Africa |
| NATIS | NATO Information Service |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| StratCom | Strategic Communications |
| SSCAT | Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team |
| UN | United Nations |

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